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RECENT CASES
Bankruptcy--Rights Inter se of Reclamation Claimants to Secu-
rities Wrongfully Repledged by Bankrupt Stockbroker-Before its
bankruptcy, a stockbrokerage firm had wrongfully repledged a large num-
ber of customers' securities. One of the pledgees liquidated enough of the
securities to satisfy the bankrupt firm's indebtedness to it and returned
the surplus to the trustee in bankruptcy. Two groups of customers iden-
tified securities which had been held by the pledgee and filed reclamation
claims against the returned surplus. The referee's finding that the claims
of one group were of superior equity and therefore entitled to satisfaction
first, was reversed by the district court in a decree the effect of which
was fully to allow the claims of the other group. On appeal, reversed.
Both groups of claimants are entitled to share in the surplus, and their
claims are of equal equity. Phillips v. Baker, 165 F. 2d 578 (C. C. A.
5th 1948).
The settlement of the estate in the instant case has been complicated
by the conflicting nuances of the rules applicable to stockbrokerage bank-
ruptcies which were developed by the case law prior to 1938. These rules
allowed customers of a bankrupt stockbroker who could identify' their
securities among those held by a pledgee of the broker to share, accord-
ing to the "equities" of their claims,2 in whatever remained after the
pledgee had satisfied his lien out of the pledged securities; 3 those who
were unable to comply with the identification procedure were relegated
to the status of general creditors. 4 The widespread dissatisfaction with
the prevailing rules 5 led the framers of the Chandler Act to formulate
a more workable system of distribution, and to this end subsection (e)
was added to . 60 of the Bankruptcy Act,6 providing a special procedure
for stockbrokerage bankruptcies. Under this procedure most 7 of the
surplus returned to the trustee in the instant case would go into a "single
and separate fund" created by § 60 (e) (2) 8 in which customers of the
1. For the technical requirements that must be met in identifying, or "tracing,"
securities, see MEYER, STOCK BROKERS AND STOCK EXCHANGES §§ 158-162 (1931).
2. See, e. g., Sexton v. American Trust Co., 45 F. 2d 372 (C. C. A. 8th 1930);
In re Toole, 274 Fed. 337 (C. C. A. 2d 1921). For an exhaustive treatment of stock-
brokerage bankruptcies, see MEYER, op. cit. supra note 1, §§ 157-178; see also 3 CoL-
LIER, BANKRUPTCY 1 60.72 (14th ed. 1941).
3. A bona fide pledgee for value has a lien on pledged securities superior to the
rights of a customer, even where the latter is an outright owner of the pledged securi-
ties. Jerome v. McCarter, 94 U. S. 734 (1876) ; McNeil -i. Tenth National Bank, 46
N. Y. 325 (1871) ; UNIFORMi STOCK TRANSFER ACT.
4. Jordahl v. Irving Trust Co., 61 F. 2d 760 (C. C. A. 2d 1932).
5. See In re Walter J. Schmidt & Co., 298 Fed. 314, 319 (S. D. N. Y. 1923) ; it
re Archer, Harvey & Co., 289 Fed. 267, 272 (D. Md. 1923). See McLaughlin, Amend-
inent of the Bankruptcy Act, 40 HAnv. L. REv. 341, 383 (1927) ; Moses, Stock Bro-
kerage Bankruptcies, 1 AM. BANKR. REv. 202 (1925); Oppenheimer, Rights and
Obligations of Customers in Stockbrokerage Bankruptcies, 37 HAmv. L. REv. 860, 885
(1924).
6. 30 STAT. 562 (1898), as amended, 11 U. S. C. § 96 (1940).
7. By the terms of § 60(e) (3), if any of the broker's general property contributed
to the pledge, a proportionate part of the surplus would go to his general estate.
8. The definition of this fund includes, in general, the property involved in the
accounts of customers. However, the punctuation of the text of § 60(e) (2) creates
certain ambiguities. See 3 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 1160.73 (14th ed. 1941).
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bankrupt, as distinguished from general creditors, would share ratably.9
This surplus, therefore, would be available to all customers of the bank-
rupt, rather than just to those in the two groups before the court,10
obviating the problems of attempting subtle adjustments of the rights
of claimants inter se and resulting in a more equitable distribution of the
property involved in the bankruptcy.
The district court had held the Chandler Act inapplicable," without
reference to the fact that the Act itself provides that its provisions
".. . shall govern proceedings so far as practicable in cases pending when
it takes effect." 1 2 The. validity of the conception of vested rights which
has been utilized by some courts in holding it impracticable to apply the
Chandler Act to proceedings pending on the effective date of the Act13
is clearly refuted by decisions allowing application of the Act to make
substantial differences in the rights of the parties. 14  It would seem that
the test of practicability has been met so long as the estate is in custodia
legis and the proceedings have not reached the stage where application
of the Chandler Act would vitiate them to such an extent that the conse-
quent loss of time, and expense to the estate, would be incommensurate
with the advantages to be gained from the use of the new provisions.'
5
The vast improvement which § 60 (e) represents, 16 and the probability
9. Under certain circumstances, customers may reclaim securities which remained
in the possession of the bankrupt. This limitation on the right of reclamation gives
rise to the question whether §60(e) exceeds the federal bankruptcy power. See 3
CoL.IER, BANKRUPTcY 1160.73 (14th ed. 1941). But cf. Martin, Substantive Regula-
tion of Security Devices under the Bankruptcy Power, 48 CoL. L. REv. 62 (1948), ques-
tioning the limits of this power.
10. This conclusion is not the only possible interpretation of § 60(e), but it seems
most in accord with the purpose of providing a more workable process for distribution
of property involved in a stockbrokerage bankruptcy. While the question of distribu-
tion of surplus pledged securities under § 60(e) has never reached the stage of reported
litigation, at least one referee in bankruptcy has denied reclamation claims under the
section on the sole ground that the securities claimed were in the possession of a
pledgee of the bankrupt on the date of bankruptcy, so holding despite the fact that
some of the securities claimed were returned to the trustee as surplus collateral and
were fully identified by their respective claimants. Referee's Order (Claim of Mary
A. Taylor), McMillan, Rapp & Co., Bkcy. No. 21225, E. D. Pa., Nov. 26, 1941;
Referee's Order (Claim of Dorothy M. Taylor), McMillan, Rapp & Co., Bkcy. No.
21225, E. D. Pa, Nov. 24, 1941. Petitions to the district court to review these orders
were withdrawn when the two claims were compromised. Referee's Order (Claims of
Mary A. and Dorothy M. Taylor), McMillan, Rapp & Co., Bkcy. No. 21225, E. D.
Pa., Dec. 29, 1941. Text writers have also expressed this conclusion. See HANNA
AND McLAUGHLIN, TEE BANKRUPrCY ACT oF 1898 As AMIENDED 81 (2d ed. 1947).
, 11. "[The adjudication of the bankrupt having been made], and the rights of the
parties having become fixed, long prior to the Chandler Amendment . . ., I think
such Amendment is not applicable here." Matter of Sterling & Baker, Bkcy. Nos.
1936, 1939, S. D. Tex., July 16, 1946. The circuit court of appeals gave no considera-
tion to § 60(e). The bankruptcy occurred Nov. 2, 1937; the Chandler Act was effec-
tive Sept. 22, 1938.
12. Section 6(b) of the Act, 52 STAT. 940 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 1 note (1940).
13. In re Raiken, 33 F. Supp. 88 (D. N. J. 1940) ; In re Mid America Co., 31 F.
Supp. 601 (S. D. Ill. 1939).
14. Republic Underwriters v. Ford, 100 F. 2d 511 (C. C. A. 5th 1938); In re
Berg, 33 F. Supp. 700 (D. Minn. 1940) ; accord, Adams v. Bowen, 46 F. 2d 294 (C. C.
A. 1st 1931) ; City of Chelsea v. Dolan, 24 F. 2d 522 (C. C. A. 1st 1928), cert. denied,
277 U. S. 606 (1928).
15. Cf. In re Old Algiers, Inc., 100 F. 2d 374 (C. C. A. 2d 1938), and especially
the oft-cited test of practicability which the court formulated. Id. at 375.
16. Since § 60(e) sets old conflicts at rest, it could be applied by analogy even
under a holding that the Chandler Act is inapplicable. It re Harriman, 31 F. Supp.
50 (S. D. N. Y. 1939).
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that it affords a more expeditious procedure,17 are certainly relevant
factors. While it may not be practicable to apply § 60 (e) at the present
stage of the proceedings in the instant case, it is submitted that earlier
a more serious consideration of this possibility should have been made
than was indicated by the district court's opinion. Even now, the burden
of showing the impracticability of applying § 60 (e) should be on those
who oppose its application.
Constitutional Law--Special Legislation-Pennsylvania's Bitu-
minous Coal Open Pit Mining Act-Plaintiff, engaged in the strip
mining of bituminous coal, brought a bill in equity to enjoin enforcement
of the Bituminous Coal Open Pit Mining Act of 1945 1 alleging that it
was a special law prohibited by the "constitution 2 in that it did not
apply to the mining industry as a whole. On appeal from a decree ad-
judging the act constitutional the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed
(Patterson, J., dissenting) holding that there were "substantial and real
differences" 3 justifying separate legislation for the bituminous industry.
Dufour v. Maize, 358 Pa. 309, 56 A. 2d 675 (1948).
Special legislation prohibition, derived from due process and vitalized
by the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment,4 reached
maturity in Pennsylvania through the constitution of 1874 which prohibits
the passage of local or special laws 5 in an enumerated list of subjects
of which mining is one. 6 Designed to eradicate eventually the vast num-
ber of special laws then on the statute books and to prevent the passage
of any further ones, this provision had its significance quickly recognized
by the courts as they promised strict enforcement.7 But while recognized
as a valid limitation on the state legislative power it does not preclude
17. In the McMillan, Rapp & Co. bankruptcy, supra note 10, the estate was settled
in less than four years. Referee's Order Discharging Trustee, McMillan, Rapp & Co.,
Bkcy. No. 21225, E. D. Pa., Oct 15, 1943.
1. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 52, § 1396.1-1396.18 (Purdon, Supp. 1946). West Virginia,
Ohio, and Indiana have statutes covering open pit or strip mining of coal. See W.
VA. CODE ANN., c. 22, art. 2a, § 2461(2) (Michie, Supp. 1947); OHIO GEN. CODE
ANN., § 898-203 (Page, Supp. 1947) ; IND. STAT. ANN., tit. 46, § 1501 (Burns, Supp.
1945). In these statutes no differentiation is made between bituminous and other
types of coal.
2. PA. CoNsT. ART. III, § 7 (1874) provides: "The General Assembly shall not
pass any local or special law: . . . Regulating labor, trade, mining or manufac-
turing."
3. Differences cited in the majority opinion were: There is no evidence that in
other stripping operations water has ever been found in a cut, that the operations adjoin
a deep mine, or that a vein of coal was left exposed at the bottom of the cut. There-
fore, "in this type of mining there is not the same danger of fire, flooding or interrup-
tion of ventilating systems of deep mines, as exists in the strip mining of bitumi-
nous coal. Also, anthracite coal has a higher combustion point than bituminous coal.
These are substantial and real differences which, in our opinion, justify the classifica-
tion made by the act."
4. U. S. CoNsT. AmEND. XIV. See Morr, DUE PRocEss OF LAW 256 et seq.
(1926) for the historical growth of the equal protection clause.
5. See note 2 supra.
6. See SANDERSON, VALIDITY OF STATUTES IN PENNSYLVANIA 95 et seq. (1898)
for a complete treatment of this provision as applied by the courts in early cases.
7. Morrison v. Bachert, 112 Pa. 322, 5 Atl. 739 (1886).
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classification 8 necessary in the public interest 9 if based on genuine and
substantial differences; 10 and provided further that the differences which
are made the basis of the classification are closely related to the purpose
of the statute."1 Differences making classification valid for one purpose
may furnish no reasonable ground for classification under other circum-
stances.. 2  As each case arises the distinctions made the basis for classi-
fication must be considered in the light of the evil which the legislature
sought to remedy. In the instant case the differences between bituminous
operations and those involving other minerals concerned the prevention
of fire and the flooding or the interruption of the ventilating systems of
deep mines; there was only a secondary relation to the primary purpose
of the act which is the conservation and improvement of the land 13 through
the planting of trees, shrubs and grasses. Even conceding that the
differences shown justify classification for purposes of backfilling and
covering the exposed coal vein 14 it appears extremely doubtful that they
justify separate legislation for the bituminous industry in the levelling of
the spoil bank in such a manner to facilitate planting, and in the actual
planting.15
Possibly moved by the urgent need for remedial legislation in an
industry which has turned west and central Pennsylvania literally upside
down, the court in upholding the statute exemplified the tendency of
courts to exercise judicial self-restraint in the realm of economic regula-
tion.' 6 Although great latitude must be granted to the legislature in its
exercise of the police power, nevertheless, there can be no justification
for classification on the theory that bituminous strippings are more ex-
tensive or conspicuous 17 than other strippings when the latter present the
same evils which are sought to be remedied. In accepting the differences
proven as "substantial" without a correlation to the primary purpose or
object of the statute, the court has permitted an inroad to be made on
the special legislation prohibition. The dangers inherent in such a de-
cision are evident.
8. Durkin v. Iingston Coal Co., 171 Pa. 193, 33 At. 237 (1895).
9. Ayars' Appeal, 122 Pa. 266, 16 Atl. 356 (1886) ; Commonwealth v. Gilligan,
195 Pa. 504, 46 Atl. 124 (1900).
10. Seabolt v. Commissioners, 187 Pa. 318, 41 Atl. 22 (1898).
11. Commonwealth v. Casey, 231 Pa. 170, 80 Ad. 78 (1911).
12. Commonwealth v. Alden Coal Co., 251 Pa. 134, 96 Atl. 246 (1915).
13. The title of the act states that it is an act, "providing for the conservation and
improvement of land affected in connection with the mining of bituminous coal by the
open pit mining method. . . ." The legislative history indicates that the primary
purpose of the act was the recovery of the soil through the planting of trees, etc.
14. However, note that the Anthracite Strip Mining Law of 1947, PA. STAT. ANN.,
tit. 52, § 681.1-681.22 (Purdon, Supp. 1947) requires backfilling, drainage, and the
coverage of the exposed vein of anthracite coal with only slight variation from the
bituminous requirements. Also, in a letter of Feb. 24, 1948, the U. S. Bureau of Mines
states that "the problem of water remaining in a cut is common to all types of strip
mining."
15. The Anthracite Act lends support to this contention since it requires the level-
ling and rounding off of peaks and ridges of the spoil banks and planting if the Secre-
tary of Forests and Waters finds that such is likely to succeed.
16. See 56 YALE L. J. 1276 (1947) n. 22, for a citation of cases in which the Su-
preme Court of the United States showed a deference to state legislation in the area
of economic regulation.
17. In the instant case the court stated: "... there is authority for the proposi-
tion that when an evil is conspicuously in need of correction, action may be taken,
although other evils exist which are not corrected." However, the cases relied on in
support of the proposition were all distinguishable from the instant one inasmuch as
in the former cases all similarly situated were subject to the various statutes.
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Contracts-Liquidated Damages in Government War Procure-
ment Contract-Under authority of the Lend-Lease Act,' the United
States contracted with petitioner for delivery of a quantity of dried eggs
to the Federal Surplus Commodities Corporation. Paragraph 9 of the
agreement set forth a scale of "liquidated damages" payable on failure to
deliver. Paragraph 7 called for payment of the same "liquidated damages"
upon vendor's failure to have specified quantities of eggs inspected and
ready for delivery by the date fixed in the offer. On May 18, 1942, the
first day on which FSCC could have requested delivery, petitioner had
not had eggs inspected. By May 22, inspection had been made, and on
May 26, FSCC made its first request for delivery. Petitioner made
timely shipments pursuant to instructions, but FSCC, on ascertaining
that petitioner's certificates had been issued after May 18, deducted from
the price ten cents per pound, on the theory that petitioner's default had
put in operation the provisions of paragraph 7. From an adverse decision
in the Court of Claims in a suit to recover the amount withheld, petitioner
appealed to the Supreme Court, where it was held, four justices dissent-
ing,2 that the clause in question was a penalty and therefore unenforceable
against petitioner. Priebe & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 68 Sup. Ct. 123
(1947).
If, as the majority opinion contends, the principles of general con-
tract law must be applied to the construction of government contracts
when Congress has not adopted a different standard, then the result of the
instant case is unimpeachable. For the fundamental distinction between
liquidated damages and a penalty is the reasonable relation which the sum
agreed on bears to any probable damage, judged at the time of the execu-
tion of the contract, which may follow a breach.3 Since the government
could have been harmed only by a failure to deliver upon request,4 and
since damages for such failure were fully covered by paragraph 9, the
clause in question could not be upheld as a reasonable forecast of probable
damages. But the bland assertion that general contract principles are
applicable in the absence of an express congressional mandate to the
contrary does not stand up under close inspection. The proposition is
often set forth in the decisions,5 but there are well recognized exceptions,
in all of which, however, the element of damages to the government is
apparent.6 Aside from these cases, different standards are applied to the
1. 55 STAT. 31 (1941), 22 U. S. C. §411 (Supp. 1946).
2. Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Murphy argued that the contract was to be
interpreted, not in terms of "elusive and uncertain principles of 'general contract law',"
but in terms of congressional enactments which make liquidated damage clauses manda-
tory in certain types of government contracts. Mr' Justice Frankfurter and the Chief
Justice, while agreeing that the clause should be stricken down as a penalty in a peace-
time government contract, maintained that congressional authorization to include
penalties in war contracts could be inferred from the unrestricted power given to the
President to procure essential war materials.
3. Wise v. United States, 249 U. S. 361, 365 (1919) ; 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS
§776 (rev. ed. 1936).
4. The argument of Mr. Justice Black (instant case at 128) that timely obtaining
of the inspection certificates would have enabled the government to prepare shipment
time tables would be valid only if the contract had required notice to the government
that the certificates had been obtained.
5. Lynch v. United States, 292 U. S. 571, 579 (1934).
6. Wisconsin Central R. R. v. United States, 164 U. S. 190 (1896) (government
may recover money paid under mistake of law); United States v. Kirkpatrick, 9
Wheat. 720, 735 (U. S. 1824) (defense of laches or neglect of duty unavailable against
government) ; Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U. S. 389, 409 (1917)
(defense of estoppel based on unauthorized acts of government agents unavailable
against government).
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amendment of government contracts than to the amendment of those
between private persons.7 And, especially in war time, a contract which
might in peace be held void for uncertainty, will be sustained.8
Furthermore, the atypical nature of government war contracts calls
for a liberal interpretation of procurement statutes. It is essential during
hostilities that the government have some control over the conduct of its
industries. It cannot regulate business potential, as it does manpower,
through the device of conscription, because the urgency of its needs cannot
be fulfilled by a recalcitrant organization.9 The economic pressure of an
enforceable penalty clause would be an effective control, and could have
been preserved in the instant case without the radical break with the past
that the majority feared.
Estate Taxation-Undistributed Income of Irrevocable Trust
Created in Contemplation of Death Not Includable in Estate of De-
ceased Grantor for Purpose of Measuring Estate Tax-At age 81,
decedent created an irrevocable trust for the sole benefit of his incompetent
son, retaining no powers of change whatsoever. The trustee was em-
powered to distribute, in his discretion, such income as necessary to
provide for the reasonable needs of the son. At the settlor's death the
corpus was swelled by undistributed income from the original gift which
was intact and by stocks and bonds purchased from undistributed ac-
cumulated trust income. The commissioner in determining a deficiency
on the ground that the transfer was in contemplation of death,1 included
in the estate of the decedent all the trust property at the date of death.
Though finding that the transfer was in contemplation of death, the Tax
Court held that the taxable estate includes that property only which the
decedent actually transferred, valued at the date of death, and. that the
commissioner erred in including the accumulated income. Estate of James
E. Friszell v. Commissioner, 9 T. C. No. 130 (November 28, 1947), CCH
TAx CT. REP. (REG.) DEc. 2720 (1947).
Though increases in value of trust corpus through reinvestment of
proceeds from the original property transferred in contemplation of death
and appreciation of that property have been held includable in the gross
estate of the grantor-decedent,2 the precise question as to whether ac-
cumulations of trust income (as distinguished from capital gains) are
so includable is of first impression.8 However, in Igleheart v. Commis-
7. See Kramer, Extraordinary Relief for War Contractors, 93 U. OF PA. L. REv.
357, 371 (1945).
8. See Hotchkiss, Some Effects of Aircraft War Procurement Contracts on the
Law of Contracts, 31 VA. L. REv. 316 (1945).
9. For a common sense recognition that the government can be under factual com-
pulsion, see Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissent in United States v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp., 315 U. S. 289, 314 (1942).
1. INT. REv. CoDE § 811 (c).
2. Igleheart v. Commissioner, 77 F. 2d 704 (C. C. A. 5th 1935) ; In re Kroger's
Estate, P-H 1943 TC M~s. DEC. SERV. ff 43,392 at p. 1244 (1943), af'd, 145 F. 2d
901, 907 (C. C. A. 6th 1944), cert. denied, 324 U. S. 866 (1945) ; accord, Schoenheit
v. Lucas, 44 F. 2d 476, 490 (C. C. A. 4th 1930) ; Attorney-General v. National Trust
Co., [1931] A. C. 818 (P.C.), reversing, [1931] 0. R. 122; Re Payne, Poplett v.
Attorney-General, [1940] 2 All Eng. 115.
3. Instant case at 2724, 2725. See Frew v. Bowers, 12 F. 2d 625, 628 (C. C. A.
2d 1926) ; but cf., Attorney-General v. Oldham, [1940] 3 All Eng. 450.
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sioner 4 the Board of Tax Appeals did not make a finding as to the mode
by which the trust corpus was enhanced r and was upheld 6 in its ruling
that "the value of the assets of the two trusts at the time of the decedent's
death should be included." 7 In the same case, the court declared that for
purposes of the estate tax, the property transferred in contemplation of
death should be treated as -remaining in the ownership of the grantor
until his death.8  Both the statement of the rule and the test given in the
Igleheart case appear to lead to a result contra to the decision of the instant
case. But in Helvering v. Hallock,9 the Supreme Court had said, in pre-
amble to a far different problem, that with reference to § 302 (c) (the fore-
runner of § 811 (c)) 10 the inter vivos transfer is the taxable event.1
This 'the Tax Court considered decisive authority for distinguishing ac-
cumulated income from appreciation of properly actually transferred.
Though indeed the estate tax is a tax on a transfer,'2 the Supreme Court
had earlier disparaged such a conceptual argument as would restrict the
word "transfer" in the statute so as to refer only to the passing of par-
ticular items of property directly transferred.' 3
Obviously the estate tax cannot be effective without supplemental
authority to tax those inter vivos transfers which substitute for testamen-
tary dispositions and would otherwise avoid the death tax.14 The pro-
vision for taxing transfers in contemplation of death is such an authority.15
Though there is no doubt that Congress may prescribe that property so
transferred be treated as remaining within the taxable estate of the grantor-
decedent to prevent the avoidance of a lawfully imposed tax, it may be
argued that the power is limited by the necessity. 16 The inclusion or
exclusion in the estate of the decedent of increases in value to the trust
corpus solely on the basis of the source of the increase hardly explores that
necessity. Clearly the "policy of taxing such gifts equally with testamen-
tary dispositions, for which they may be substituted, ... ." 1 requires
that income accumulated at the express direction of the grantor and not
to be distributed until his death, be included in his estate. Antithetically,
mandatory gifts of trust income should not be included.' 8  Collaterally,
4. 28 B. T. A. 888 (1933).
5. Though the court in the instant case at 2724 refers to a finding by the Board
of Tax Appeals in the Igleheart case that there was a reinvestment of trust corpus,
no such finding appears in the record and, in fact, the dissenting judge points out:
... how the difference of $108,375 was added to the trust fund . . . by the trus-
tee, contributions . . ., or by the general rise in the market . .. , or otherwise, is
not shown in the evidence and the findings of fact." Id. at 913.
6. Igleheart v. Commissioner, 77 F. 2d 704 (C. C. A. 5th 1935).
7. Id. at 711. (Italics supplied.)
8. Ibid.
9. 309 U. S. 106 (1940).
10. See note 1 supra.
11. -elvering v. Hallock, 309 U. S. 106, 111 (1940). Quoted by the Tax Court,
instant case at 2726.
12. See U. S. Trust Co. v. Helvering, 307 U. S. 57, 60 (1939) ; PAUL, FEDERAL
ESTATE AND Gn=r TAXATION § 1.05 (1942).
13. Chase National Bank v. United States, 278 U. S. 327, 337 (1929).
14. See Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U. S. 312, 314 (1932) ; PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE
AND Gn=r TAxATioN § 7.05 (1942).
15. See Heiner v. Donnan, supra note 14 at 330; PAuTL, FEDERAL EsrATn AND
Gr TAXATioN § 7.04 (1942).
16. Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U. S. 531, 542 (1927).
17. Milliken v. United States, 283 U. S. 15, 23 (1931). (Italics supplied.)
18. See Whitney v. State Tax Commission of New York, 309 U. S. 530, 539
(1940), wherein Mr. Justice Frankfurter* pointed out that the substitution-for-testa-
mentary-disposition test does not in all instances delimit the inclusion in the estate of
the grantor of inter vivos gifts.
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the problem of the taxability of realized capital gains is subject to identical
analysis. In between the poles of these relatively easy situations grantors
may pose more perplexing problems by stipulating discretionary or con-
tingent powers of distribution to the trustees or by granting rights to
compel distribution to beneficiaries. 19 Nevertheless the rule emerges that
where the grantor has provided for the "assimilation" into the trust corpus
of a particular increase in value by barring its distribution, such increase
should be included in the estate of the decedent. 20 But the instant case
illustrates the necessity of further inquiry to prevent the effective use of
pseudo-powers designed to circumvent the rule.
21
Evidence-Use of Copy to Refresh Present Recollection Barred
by Willful Spoliation of Original-A police officer who tapped a tele-
phone wife, made notes of the incriminating conversations of the accused
and thereafter dictated from these notes, was allowed to use the dictated
statement to refresh his recollection, although he had destroyed the original
notes to escape cross-examination. On appeal from a judgment of con-
viction, the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court reversed, (one judge
dissenting), holding that it was error to allow the officer to refresh his
recollection from a writing which purported to be a transcript of original
notes willfully destroyed by him to frustrate cross-examination. People
v. Betts, 272 App. Div. 737, 74 N. Y. S. 2d 791 (1st Dep't 1947).
The court apparently treated the situation as one of present recollec-
tion refreshed.' Under that doctrine, the evidence offered in proof is the
spoken word, the memorandum forming no part of it.2  The function of
the memorandum is to stimulate the memory of the witness so that he
can testify from independent recollection. Rationally, the nature, origin
or past history of the actuating cause is immaterial. 3 The primary concern
is whether the memorandum actually serves the purpose of refreshing
recollection. To that end, safeguards are provided to assure the triers of
fact that what the witness puts before the court is in fact his recollection
and knowledge. The writing must be shown to the opponent on demand
for the purpose of inspection and cryss-examination based on such inspec-
19. The Tax Court noted (instant case at 2725) that the accumulation was disre-
tionary in this case, but it did not stress that fact as one which would distinguish the
case from a case where the accumulation was mandatory.
20. Cf. Estate of Daniel Guggenheim, 40 B. T. A. 181 (1939), aff'd, 117 F. 2d 469
(C. C. A. 2d 1941), cert. denied, 314 U. S. 621 (1941). Accumulated income of inter
vivos trust (not in contemplation of death) held taxable to estate of grantor because
of power of revocation retained by grantor-decedent. This case was distinguished by
the Tax Court (instant case at 2726).
21. The findings of fact disclose that the 34 year old incompetent son lived with
his parents, obviously of considerable means, who took care of him in every way, thus
negating any valid purpose for the discretionary power of distribution during the life
of his parents.
1. ". . . where, as here, an officer of the law attempts to refresh his recollection
from a writing which purports to be a transcript of original [notes] willfully destroyed
by him to frustrate cross-examination, the witness should not be permitted to use such
a document to aid him." Instant case at 741.
2. Lord Ellenborough formulated the often quoted phrase: "It is not the memo-
randum that is the evidence but the recollection of the witness." Henry v. Lee, 2 Chitty
124, 125 (1814).
3. Jewett v. United States, 15 F. 2d 955, 956 (C. C. A. 9th 1926).
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tion.4 The jury may also examine it to measure its propriety,5 but the
offering party may not read the memorandum to the jury as substantive
evidence.6 That apparently was done here 7 and, under the court's view
that the case was one of present recollection refreshed, could have con-
stituted reversible error.
A candid reading of the case indicates, however, that refreshed
memory was not the situation presented. Rather, the case represents the
principle of past recollection recorded. 8 There, the witness testifies that
he is devoid of present recollection but that he made a contemporaneous
memorandum of the facts in question which he now offers as his testi-
mony.9 If the contents of the writing are to be safely received, limitations
are required to guarantee their accuracy. The original may well be
demanded as the best evidence of what was really recorded.'0 A copy
may be used where the original has been accounted for as unavailable-"
but where there has been a willful destruction of the original, there arises
a strong presumption that the document was inimical to the spoliator's
cause.' 2  The presumption is not conclusive, 13 secondary evidence being
receivable if the court finds that the destruction was free from fraudulent
design.' 4 The trial court's discretion in determining the good faith of the
explanation will be final on appeal unless it be shown that the court abused
its discretion. 15 In the instant case, the Appellate Division indicated
4. Miller v. Greenwald Petticoat Co., 192 App. Div. 559, 183 N. Y. Supp. 97 (1st
Dep't 1920); Richardson v. Nassau Electric Co., 190 App. Div. 529, 180 N. Y. Supp.
109 (2d Dep't 1920).
5. Commonwealth v. Jeffs, 132 Mass. 5, 6 (1882). 3 WIGMORE, EVIDFNCE § 763
(3d ed. 1940).
6. In Garber v. New York City Ry. Co., 92 N. Y. Supp. 722 (1905) it was error
to read as original evidence a memorandum which was available only to refresh the
witness' memory. Cf. Berkowsky v. New York City Ry. Co., 127 App. Div. 544, 546,
111 N. Y. Supp. 989 (1st Dep't 1908).
7. The court made no reference to the apparent failure of the clerk who had repro-
duced the dictated statements to testify to their accuracy as would be required under
hearsay evidence principles. In People v. Randazzio, 194 N. Y. 147, 87 N. E. 112
(1909) an analogous situation was presented and a transcript from a stenographer's
minutes was held competent where the stenographer swore that the transcript had been
compared with the original and that it was correct.
8. Briefs of respondent and appellants both premise the argument on this prin-
ciple; the former at p. 12, the latter at p. 10. The court did not believe that the wit-
ness could recall the details of the conversations and indicated that he admitted as
much.
9. In England, this process was recognized in Doe v. Perkins, 3 T. R. 654 (1790).
For an early example of the legitimacy of the process in the United States, see Haig
v. Newton, 1 Mills Const. Reports 423 (S. C. 1817).
10. "The original paper must be produced . . . or its absence must be accounted
for." Mankoff, Inc. v. Erie R. Co., 97 Misc. 415, 417, 161 N. Y. Supp. 346, 347 (1916).
Graf v. Weinstein, 161 N. Y. Supp. 337 (1916) (error to read into the record a copy
of books of account instead of producing them).
11. People v. Weinberger, 239 N. Y. 307, 146 N. E. 434 (1925) ; People v. Ran-
dazzio, 194 N. Y. 147, 87 N. E. 112 (1909). See also People v. Engelbrecht, 260 App.
Div. 912 (1st Dep't 1940) as reported in dissenting opinion of the instant case at 744.
12. In re Eno's Will, 196 App. Div. 131, 163, 187 N. Y. Supp. 756, 779 (1st Dep't
1921).
13. Tilton v. Iowa Oil Co., 139 Cal. App. 93, 97, 33 P. 2d 446, 448 (1934). "Such
explanation [of the destruction] the plaintiff was bound to give affirmatively." Blade
v. Noland, 12 Wend. 173, 175 (N. Y. 1834).
14. Dearing v. Pearson, 8 Misc. 269, 271, 28 N. Y. Supp. 715, 716 (1894) ; Steele
v. Lord, 70 N. Y. 280 (1877) ; see Harmon v. Matthews, 27 N. Y. S. 2d 656, 663
(1941).
15. Dearing v. Pearson, supra note 14 at 717. But see Mason v. Libbey, 90 N. Y.
683, 684 (1882) and Harmon v. Matthews, 27 N. Y. S. 2d 656 (1941).
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strongly that the trial court had abused its discretion. 16 It follows from
these considerations that by application of the rules called for within the
facts, the court could have come to a quick and proper solution.
Considered in the light of the purpose for which the memorandum
is used in the situation of present recollection refreshed, the limitations
noted are sufficient to provide against the use of false aids. The court
here, by resting the case on that doctrine and fusing to it the rule that
fraudulent spoliation of an original record bars use of a copy, has added
an unnecessary limitation which will likely lead to confusion in future
applications of the principle..
Federal Drug Control-Extension of the Food, Drug and Cos-
metic Act to Cover an Entirely Intrastate Transaction-A retail drug-
gist, having purchased properly labelled bottles of sulfathiazole from a
distributor who imported them from another state, transferred twelve
tablets to a box labelled only "Sulfathiazole," and so sold them. Drugs
are misbranded, under § 502 (f) of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act, unless labelled with directions for use.' Section 301 (k) prohibits
altering the label, or "any other act" that results in the -misbranding of
articles "held for sale" after interstate shipment.2  He was convicted of
misbranding drugs. Affirming the conviction, the Supreme Court (three
Justices dissenting) decided that "held for sale" extended the prohibitions
of § 301 (k) to all saleo after interstate shipment, thus safeguarding the
public "by applying the act . . . all the way to . . . the . . . consumer."
United States v. Sullivan, 68 Sup. Ct. 331 (1948).
The Act, expressly designed to expand protection given by existing
law,3 has been interpreted liberally in previous decisions.4 The Sullivan
case climaxes a policy of lengthening the reach of federal food and drug
control, insuring thereby that the ultimate consumer will benefit from
the protection given by § 502 (f).5 However, two important problems
raised by the decision were not squarely met. First, the Court regarded
the constitutionality of applying § 301 (k) to a second and entirely intra-
state sale as settled by the case of McDernott v. Wisconsin.6 The latter
case involved labelling on interstate containers and an original sale by an
interstate importer. It seems clear, therefore, that, under the accepted
doctrine that federal control constitutionally extends to intrastate activity
16. "To say that a police officer in good faith and innocently 'made an error of
judgment' when he destroyed documents because he 'didn't wish to be cross-examined
about them' is a patent contradiction of terms." Instant case at 742.
1. 52 STAT. 1051 (1938), 21 U. S. C. § 352(f) (1940).
2. 52 STAT. 1042 (1938), 21 U. S. C, § 331 (1940).
3. H. R. REP. No. 807, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (Committee Print) 3 (1947) (recom-
mending that § 301 (k) be amended to read ". . . while held for sale (whether or not
the first sale) . . .") ; H. R. RE. No. 2139, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 1, 3 (1938).
4. United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U. S. 277 (1943) ; United States v. Lee, 131
F. 2d 464 (C. C. A. 7th 1942).
5. 81 CONG. REc. 2019 (1937) ; SEN. REp. No. 361, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1935).
For effects of incorrect use of sulfa drugs, see Garvin, Complications Following the
Administration of Sulfanilamide, 113 J. Am. MEDICAL Ass'N 288-291 (1939).
6. 228 U. S. 115 (1913). This case held that federal labelling requirements in-
cluded containers removed from a bulk package for the first sale after interstate ship-
ment. Although some language in the opinion might be taken as supporting the instant
case, its applicability is doubtful, in view of its distinguishing facts.
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directly affecting interstate commerce, 7 the McDermott decision does
not establish as constitutional the regulations upheld in the instant case.
Moreover, since this retail sale affects a product neither destined for in-
terstate commerce nor competing with interstate goods, little support for
the decision appears in the theories that have hitherto justified federal
intrastate regulation.8 However, the legislative history of the Act in-
dicates that, because of the complexity and scope of food and drug control,
adequate protection cannot be provided unless federal and state super-
vision are coextensive.9 Without federal intrastate assistance, transactions
such as that in the instant case may go unprevented. Therefore, it could
have been validly argued that such activity, rendering useless regulation
designed to keep interstate commerce free of articles injurious to life and
health, falls within the direct burden rule.
Accepting the constitutionality of § 301 (k), a second problem arises
from the fact that it covers equally food, drugs and cosmetics. Thus, if
transferring drugs from bulk to retail containers without reproducing
the interstate label constitutes "any other act" misbranding drugs, the
same seems true of foods. This would place.an impractical restriction on
grocery sales. Since this act infringes so far on state police power, to
say that the Administrator has discretion to disregard "technical infrac-
tions," 10 is not a sufficient limitation on federal control. An interpreta-
tion of "any other act" to cover drugs and exclude foods, which is possible
within the framework of the statutory language, may provide the neces-
sary limitation.:"
By summarily dismissing both issues involved, the majority has left
a dangerous precedent for unlimited extension of federal power. Future
decisions should be careful to confine this case within the indicated limits,
on the basis of the peculiar importance of the protection given.
International Law-Effect of State Statute of Limitations on
Foreign Sovereigns-Defendant insured plaintiff's ship under a con-
tract whereby losses were to be payable to plaintiff or to Mexico "as their
interests might appear." The ship was lost, and plaintiff put in a claim
for the insurance. When plaintiff brought a court action, an order was
issued allowing defendant to notify Mexico of pending suit. Under the
pertinent section of the New York Civil Practice Act' this notice started
7. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, 546 (1935) ; N. L. R.
B. v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1, 37 (1937).
8. The progress of federal expansion can be seen in such cases as Santa Cruz
Fruit Packing Co. v. N. L. R. B., 303 U. S. 453 (1938) ; United States v. Wrightwood
Dairy Co., 315 U. S. 110 (1942) ; Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U. S. 111 (1942).
9. H. R. REP. No. 807, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (Committee Print) 6-7 (1947);
Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Cont-
inerce on H. R. 6906, H. R. 8805, H. R. 8941, and S. 5, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 85, 103-
131 (1935). It should be noted here that this transaction was criminal under the law
of the state. Ga. Laws 1939, Part I, fit. VI, No. 184.
10. ". . . the Administrator is given . . . broad discretion . . . to enable
him to perform his duties . . . without wasting his efforts on . . . technical in-
fractions of the law." Instant case at 335.
11. A persuasive argument in favor of this interpretation of the Act is made in the
concurring opinion. Instant case at 336.
1. N. Y. Cir. P Ac. AcT § 51a, Note, 14 ST. JoiN's L. REv. 221 (1940), 39 CoL.
L. REv. 1061 (1939). After notice has been given the suit may not proceed until the
19481
712 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96
a one year statute of limitations running against Mexico. After the
statute had run, plaintiff renewed the action, Mexico having failed to in-
tervene, but Mexico then appeared specially and moved that the case be
dismissed for want of jurisdiction, on the ground that Mexico, an immune
foreign sovereign,2 was an indispensable party. The court held that
Mexico was neither an indispensable nor even a proper party, describing
the action as merely a dispute in per-onam on a debt between the plain-
tiff ship company and the insurer, any disposal of which would not pre-
vent Mexico from establishing a separate claim against the insurer in a
subsequent suit. The court denied Mexico's further motion that the order
allowing defendant to give notice be vacated, as a form of process, on the
ground that the notice given had none of the "attributes or effects of
process" on an immune sovereign. Federal Motorship Corp. v. Johnson
and Higgins, 119 N. Y. L. J. 391 (Sup. Ct. Jan. 30, 1948).
The holding that Mexico was not a proper party to this suit in
itself was sufficient to dispose of the case. The attention given to the
statute of limitations would consequently be relevant to the actual decision
only if the primary holding were overturned, and it would have certainly
been more expeditious to decide the nature of the action before the
statute was put into operation originally. The purpose of such a short
and unique statute of limitations is to foreclose, at least in the jurisdic-
tion of its enactment, any future claims against the defendant on the
same cause of action, and so to circumvent the unavailability of the in-
dispensable party. This is its sole utility for the defendant. The court's
discussion of its applicability to Mexico is significant, as an indication
of a willingness to apply limitation statutes to foreign sovereigns in the
face of immunity claims. It has long been the American law that neither
the United States$ nor the individual states 4 are subject to statutes of
limitations unless included therein by express provisions. Founded on the
concept of the dignity of the sovereign, 5 the rule has been retained on the'
theory that the public rights should not suffer from the negligence of
government officials who have failed to act promptly. 6 Until a few years
ago there was considerable doubt as to whether forum statutes of limita-
tions applied to foreign sovereigns. The only decision on the point held
that Italy was bound by a New York statute but there was no opinion
handed down. 7  Supreme Court dicta had expressed doubt that the im-
notified party intervenes or until the statute runs. This substitute for interpleader
became law in 1939 when there was danger of double liability in connection with
property held for those in conquered countries. For problems of interpleader where
there is no jurisdiction over one of the parties to be interpleaded, see Chafee, Inter-
state Interpleader, 33 YALE L. J. 685 (1924).
2. The general rule that a foreign sovereign is immune from suit is well estab-
lished. The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 7 Cranch 116 (U. S. 1812) ; Wulfsohn
v. Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, 234 N. Y. 372, 138 N. E. 24 (1923),
error dis. 266 U. S. 580 (1924) ; Research in International Law, Harvard Law School,
Draft Convention, 26 Am. J. INT'L. L. 455, 456 and comment at 527 (1932).
3. United States v. Thompson, 98 U. S. 486 (1876) ; United States v. Nashville
C. and St. L. Ry., 118 U. S. 120 (1886) ; Davis, Director General of Railroads, as
Agent of the United States v. Corona Coal Company, 265 U. S. 219 (1924).
4. Florida C. and P. Ry. v. Reynolds, 183 U. S. 471 (1902).
5. Magdalen College Case, 11 Coke 66b, 68b (1616); WATKINS, THE STATE AS
PARTY LITIGANT 33 (1927).
6. See United States v. Hoar, 2 Mason 311, 314 (C. C. D. Mass. 1821) ; Guaranty
Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U. S. 126, 132 (1938).
7. Royal Italian Government v. International Committee of the Y. M. C. A., 273
N. Y. 468, 6 N. E. 2d 407 (1936). In this case plaintiff had allowed 16 years to elapse
since the right of action had arisen.
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munity should be extended to foreign sovereigns,8 and finally in 1938
the Court held, in Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States,9 that a six year
statute did preclude a suit based on a foreign government's claim when the
one representing that government was party plaintiff. The statute there
involved, like the one in the principal case, started running only on
notice. The Court's reasoning was that a foreign sovereign sues as a
matter of comity and is thus subject to the rules of the forum. Although
in the instant case Mexico was resisting being brought into the suit, the.
same reasoning would apply.
A rule that foreign sovereigns must come in and contest within a
reasonable period claims of which their interest is preventing the adju-
dication, on penalty of being foreclosed, would protect residents against
stale claims without requiring more of the foreign sovereigns than is re-
quired of other claimants. The serious drawback to the New York
statute is that it may be effective to foreclose suit only in New York and
may not be too salutary to a defendant with multi-state contacts who can
be caught elsewhere.
International Law-Salary of League of Nations Employee Not
Excluded From Gross Income for Tax Purposes-Petitioner, a New
Zealand citizen employed by the League of Nations, entered the United
States in 1940 with 19 other League officials to continue work disrupted
in Geneva by the war. Funds contributed by member-nations to support
the League were used to pay Petitioner for his services, which consisted
of accounting and statistical compilation. An application that this salary
be exempt from income taxation, as is that of foreign government
officials,' was rejected, and the Tax Court affirmed a finding by the Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue that Petitioner was deficient in tax pay-
ments. John Henry Chapman v. Commissioner, 9 T. C. No. 87 (Oct.
9, 1947), CCH TAx CT. REP. (REG.) DEC. 2501 (1947).
Although under customary international law immunity from local
sovereignty is extended to foreign diplomats in the nation to which they
are sent,2 it is not true that all international representatives necessarily
enjoy this privilege.3 Usually diplomatic immunity is limited to those
who are properly authorized, received, and accredited as members of their
government's embassy or legation.4 Non-diplomatic officials, such as
consuls, are presumably subject to the jurisdiction of the territory,5 and
any privileges they enjoy result from treaties and not from general in-
ternational law or custom.6 The League expressly provided for diplo-
8. See French Republic v. Saratoga Vichy Spring Co., 191 U. S. 427, 437 (1903).
But ef. United States v. Nashville, C. and St. L. Ry., 118 U. S. 120, 125 (1886).
9. 304 U. S. 126 (1938), Note, 32 Am. J. INT'L. L. 542 (1938), 26 CALIF. L. REv.
713 (1938).
1. Revenue Act of 1942, § 149(a), 56 STAT. 842 (1942).
2. Instructions to Diplomatic Officers of the United States, c. VII-1 (1927), re-
printed in PFANKUCHEN, A DOCUMENTARY TEXTBOOK IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 415
(1940).
3. Auer v. Costa, 23 F. Supp. 22 (D. C. Mass. 1938).
4. Carbone v. Carbone, 123 Misc. 656, 206 N. Y. Supp. 40 (Sup. Ct. 1924).
5. In re Baiz, 135 U. S. 403 (1890).
6. Legal Position and Functions of Consuls in RESEARCH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
201, 214 (Harv. Law School 1932), 26 Am. J. INT'L L. 201, 214 (Supp. 1932).
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matic immunity for its representatives,7 but the United States, despite in-
stances of cooperation,s had refused to be bound by the Covenant.9 Peti-
tioner's position was almost like that of a diplomat in a country to which
he was not accredited. 10 In the past League representatives in the United
States were treated as distinguished visitors, i. e., given custom courtesies,
free entry privileges, and protection as requested," all of which is short
of recognition of diplomatic or non-diplomatic status. It is not unnatural
that the Treasury hesitated to accord Petitioner special immunity despite
his argument that the League was not a state12 and that since member
nations contributed the funds from which he was paid, he should be con-
sidered a tax-free employee of those governments.
Foreign's representatives to the United Nations will not be bothered
with the problem from the tax standpoint as the Internal Revenue Code
has been amended to exclude their official salaries in figuring gross in-
come.' 4 But the broader aspect of the question, that is, the scope of the
immunity to be extended to UN representatives and to which officials,
remains unanswered.' 5 The UN Charter, less ambitious than the com-
parable League provision, requires only such immunity for its officials
as may be necessary for the exercise of their functions with the Organiza-
tion.'6  Plainly this is short of diplomatic immunity. Since the Charter
is apparently not considered self-executing,' 7 a national law like the In-
ternational Organizations Immunities Act 18 is required to implement it.
For this reason the League standard was more desirable. Tradition and
case law have molded "diplomatic immunity" into a well defined concept.
7. COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS Art. 7.
8. One example was under the so-called Neutrality Act of 1935, 49 STAT. 1081
(1935). Under this law, President Roosevelt prohibited exports of war materials to
Italy and Ethiopia, directly supporting League sanctions. See also I HACKWORTH,
DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 335-336 (1940).
9. 48 STAT. 1183 (1934), 22 U. S. C. §272 (1940).
10. Instant case at 2505; see note 2 mipra; IV HACKwORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 539 (1942). But see id. at 460.
11. To the effect that agents of the League were not comprehended in the defini-
tion of diplomatic officers in 38 STAT. 806 (1915), 22 U. S. C. § 40 (1940), see the
communication of Oct. 16, 1933, from the Under Secretary of State (Phillips) to the
Turkish Ambassador (Muhtar) quoted in IV HACKWORTH, op. cit. supra, at 422.
Diplomatic privileges were not extended to representatives of the Pan-American Union
at this time. Cf. THE CONVENTION FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL Dis-
PUTES, THE HAGUE 1907 Art. XLVI, an agreement signed by the United States.
12. LEAGUE OF NATIONS, OFFICIAL JOURNAL 21 (1920) ; Rex v. Christian, [1924]
Juta's So. Afr. Rep., App. Div., 101, 136; I HAcwoRTu, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 50 (1940).
13. U. S. citizens are specifically excluded from the Act. Apparently it is con-
sidered unwise to set up a tax-free occupational group among U. S. nationals.
14. INT. REv. CODE § 116(h). The fact that the law has been changed to exclude
UN members supports the Court's finding that petitioner's income was not to be ex-
cluded.
15. For background material on this problem see HILL, IMMUNITIES AND PRVI-
LEGES OF INTERNATIONAL OFFICIALS (1947), reviewed in 96 U. OF PA. L. REV. 446
(1948). For a recent case involving the same question see Westchester County v.
Ranollo, 187 Misc. 777, 67 N. Y. S. 2d 31 (City Ct. 1946).
16. CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS c. XVI, Art. 105.
17. The United States and the United Nations have signed an agreement regarding
the UN headquarters. Art. V, § 15 provides for certain immunities for representatives.
Pub. L. No. 357, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (Aug. 4, 1947). See also CONVENTION ON THE
PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF THE UNITED NATIONS, UNITED NATIONS, JOURNAL OF
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, FIRST SESSION, 687-93 (1946).
18. 59 STAT. 669, 22 U. S. C. 288 (Supp. 1946). Preuss, The International Or-
ganizations Immunities Act, 40 Am. J. INT'L L. 332 (1946).
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On the other hand, "immunity necessary for effective work" may be
limited from the start by the interpretations of national governments which
may or may not be in complete sympathy with the international mission
within their borders. So restricted the term may have little significance
and the freedoms it guarantees prove to be illusory.
Labor Law-Attorneys Employed by Insurance Company Eligi-
ble for Representation by Rank-and-File Union Under Taft-Hartley
Act-In a National Labor Relations Board representation proceed-
ing, the Independent Insurance and Banking Employees Union, an un-
affiliated organization which admits to membership all persons employed
"in all branches of the insurance and banking industry," 1 petitioned for
exclusive collective bargaining rights with respect to eleven attorneys
employed by a casualty insurance company. Salaried at $1,500 to $3,000
per year, these attorneys are not vested with the discretion ordinarily
reposed in the lawyer by his client. They may exercise their legal judg-
ment only within the narrow confines staked out by company policies.
In predetermined types of cases a jury trial is never to be requested, and
in particular fact situations certain affirmative defenses are always to be
pleaded, such as the defense of contributory negligence in every action in-
volving the death of a plaintiff. The attorneys may not settle cases upon
their own initiative, are not attorneys of record, and litigate only those
claims which involve less than $3,000. They are hired in the same manner
as other company employees, are required to keep the same hours, are
subject to the regular wage deductions and receive vacations based upon
length of service. In ordering a representation election for the lawyers
as a separate unit, the Board refused to "deprive these attorneys of their
right to be represented by a labor organization for the purposes of col-
lective bargaining, even though the labor organization admits non-pro-
fessional employes to membership." Lumbermen's Mutiml Casualty Co.,
75 N. L. R. B. No. 129 (Jan. 30, 1948), 1 CCH LAB. LAW SERV. 1f 6336
(1948).
Under the Wagner Act,2 the Board frequently certified labor or-
ganizations as the bargaining representatives of professional employees,8
and at least insofar as professional employees were concerned, had con-
sistently followed the Globe 4 doctrine of placing such personnel either
in separate or industrial units, depending upon the desires of the em-
ployees themselves as expressed in separate self-determination elections. 5
The Taft-Hartley Act 6 endorses this policy of the Board by defining pro-
1. CONST. AND BY-LAWS, Independent Insurance and Banking Employees Union,
Art. I, §§ 2, 3, Art. II, § 3.
2. 49 STAT. 449 (1935).
3. Spicer Mfg. Corp., 55 N. L. R. B. 1491 (1944); Boston Edison Co., 51 N. L. R.
B. 118 (1943) ; Wagner Electric Corp., 67 N. L. R. B. 1104 (1945) ; Aluminum Corp.
of America, 62 N. L. R. B. 318 (1945).
4. Globe Machine and Stamping Co., 3 N. L. R. B. 294 (1937).
5. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 58 N. L. R. B. 1188 (1944) ; Radio Corp. of America,
57 N. L. R. B. 1729 (1944); Great Lakes Terminal Warehousing Co., 21 N. L. R. B.
580 (1940).
6. 61 STAT. 136, 28 U. S. C. A. § 151 (Supp. 1947).
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fessional employees 7 and establishing for them in the law itself 8 the
Globe doctrine of self-determination. 9
In finding that the relationship of these attorneys to the insurance
company was more like that between employer and employee than one
between lawyer and client, the Board cast aside objections 10 by the com-
mittees on legal ethics of three bar associations. Certainly the evidence
supports the Board's conclusion. That attorneys are officers of the court
and fiduciaries does not render less valid the proposition that there is
nothing inconsistent between self-organization for collective bargaining
and faithful service to the employer." The bar association opinions evince
concern over the possible effect of strikes upbn the duty of an attorney
not to withdraw from employment except for good cause.12 Apparently
overlooked was that trial postponements have been granted for reasons
less cogent than labor disputes. Urging that an attorney must not permit
the interests of any lay agency to intervene between him and his client,'
3
but faced with the fact that these attorneys represent holders of casualty
insurance policies when they are indeed salaried employees of the in-
surer, the American Bar Association opinion attempts a reconciliation
with Canon 35 14 by finding that "essentially the interests of the insured
and the company are identical." Such reasoning is more surprising than
it is convincing; the identity created by subrogation in law is not to be
so glibly equated with identity of interest in fact. The attempt of these
attorneys to better their economic status by affiliation with a lay organiza-
tion might well indicate a definite shortcoming in the bar associations.
Their opposition to unionization of attorneys would be more effective if
they themselves promoted legitimate economic aspirations and realized
that codes of ethics are inescapably linked with standards of living.
7. "Sec. 2(12). The term 'professional employee' means-(a) any employee en-
gaged in work (i) predominantly intellectual and varied in character as opposed to
routine mental, manual, mechanical or physical work; (ii) involving the consistent
exercise of discretion and judgment in its performance; (iii) of such a character that
the output produced or the result accomplished cannot be standardized in relation to
a given period of time; (iv) requiring knowledge of an advanced type in a field of
science or learning customarily acquired by a prolonged course of specialized intel-
lectual instruction and study in an institution of higher learning. . ..
8. Sec. 9(b) provides that "the board shall not (1) decide that any unit is appro-
priate for such [collective bargaining] purposes if such unit includes both professional
employees and employees who are not professional employees unless a majority of
such professional employees vote for inclusion in such unit. . .
9. See CONFERENcE REPORT, LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT, H. R. REp. No.
510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 47 (1947).
10. For subsequently issued opinions outlining the stand taken by the bar associa-
tions, see OPINION 275 (Sept. 20, 1947), Standing Committee on Professional Ethics
and Grievances, Am. Bar Ass'n.; Opinion of the Committee on Professional Ethics
of the Ass'n. of the Bar of the City of N. Y. (Ref. No. 964), issued jointly with the
N. Y. County Lawyers Ass'n., published in THE REcoRn OF THE Ass'N. OF THE BAR
OF THE CITY OF N. Y., Vol. 2, No. 5 (May, 1947).
11. Bethlehem-Alameda Shipyard, 59 N. L. R. B. 1525, 1527 (1945).
12. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICs, Am. Bar Ass'n., Canon 44: "The right of
an attorney or counsel to withdraw from employment, once assumed, arises only from
good cause."
13. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, Am. Bar Ass'n., Canon 35: "The profes-
sional services of a lawyer should not be controlled or exploited by any lay agency,
personal or corporate, which intervenes between client and lawyer. A lawyer's respon-
sibilities and qualifications are individual. He should avoid all relations which direct
the performance of his duties by or in the interest of such intermediary. A lawyer's
relation to his client should be personal, and the responsibility should be direct to the
client. . . ." Hereafter cited as Canon 35.
14. SuPra note 13.
RECENT CASES
Labor Law-Fair Labor Standards Act-Applicability to Em-
ployees Producing War Materials Under Cost-Plus Contracts-The
employees of a corporation which had operated a shipyard and built ships
under a cost-plus contract sued for and recovered overtime, liquidated
damages and attorneys' fees under the Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938.1 The shipyard, tools, materials, and the vessels at all stages of
construction were the property of the United States. On appeal, the court
held that while the employees who had worked on Liberty Ships were
covered by the Act, those who had worked on combat tankers were not,
as such employees were not "producing goods for commerce." (Two
judges dissenting.) St. Johns River Shipbuilding Corporation v. Adams,
164 F. 2d 1012 (C. C. A. 5th 1948).
There is substantial disagreement among the circuits as to whether
employees who worked under cost-plus contracts for the production or
processing of war materials are within the provisions of the Act.2  In
general, those courts which have denied recovery have used two bases
for their decisions: (1) the contractor was an agent of the United States,
his employees were Government employees and thus exempt,3 and (2)
the employees were not engaged in the production of goods for commerce.
The basis of Government agency has, at best, weak support,4 and was not
pleaded by the defendant in the instant case. The court rested its decision
on the commerce theory and distinguished between Liberty Ships and
combat tankers on the grounds that there was an expectation of utilizing
the Liberty Ships as vehicles of commerce, while there was no such ex-
pectation for the combat tankers. This seems to misinterpret the Act's
definition of "commerce." 5 One test of whether goods are produced for
commerce is the expectation of the producer that the goods will be
shipped across State lines.6 The same court, while denying recovery to
another group of employees producing munitions on the grounds that the
employer was a Government agent, stated that if the employer had been
an independent contractor, as in the instant case, and had shipped the
munitions across State lines, the employees would have been covered.
7
It is difficult to determine how the court can justifiably distinguish be-
tween munitions and combat tankers. In view of the statutory language,
the introduction of the requirement that the ships possess a "commercial"
use is unduly restrictive. Certainly, previous statutes and judicial de-
cisions have included other situations far removed from a strictly "com-
mercial" concept within "commerce." 8 Other courts, when faced with
this same general problem,9 have concluded that since the Government
1. 52 STAT. 1060 (1938), 29 U. S. C. §201 (1940).
2. Granting recovery: Bell v. Porter, 159 F. 2d 117 (C. C. A. 7th 1946), order
granting cert. vacated, 330 U. S. 813 (1947) ; Clyde v. Broderick, 144 F. 2d 348 (C. C.
A. 10th 1944). Denying recovery: Divins v. Hazeltine Electronics Corp., 163 F. 2d
100 (C. C. A. 2d 1947) ; Kennedy v. Silas Mason, 164 F. 2d 1016 (C. C. A. 5th 1948).
3. 52 STAT. 1060 (1938), 29 U. S. C. § 203(d) (1940).
4. For an excellent criticism of this rationale, see 60 HAxv. L. REv. 656 (1947).
5. 52 STAT. 1060 (1938), 29 U. S. C. § 203(i) (1940). "'Commerce' means trade,
commerce, transportation, transmission or communication among the several States or
from any State to any place outside thereof." (Emphasis added.)
6. See the most recent interpretation of the Act by the Wage and Hour Admin-
istrator, 20 LAB. REL. REP. (Wages and Hours) 3027, 3029 (1947).
7. See Kennedy v. Silas Mason, 164 F. 2d 1016, 1017 (C. C. A. 5th 1948).
8. Edwards v. United States, 314 U. S. 160 (1941) (transportation of people
across State lines) ; United States v. Hill, 248 U. S. 420 (1919) (whiskey for per-
sonal consumption) ; Caminetti v. United States, 242 U. S. 470 (1917) (transporta-
tion of women across State lines for immoral purposes).
9. Divins v. Hazeltine Electronics Corp., 163 F. 2d 100 (C. C. A. 2d 1947);
Barksdale v. Ford, Bacon & Davis, 70 F. Supp. 690 (E. D. Ark. 1947).
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takes possession at the point of manufacture and is the ultimate consumer,
the materials are not goods within the meaning of the Act.10 This ration-
ale ignores the purpose of excepting the ultimate consumer, namely, to
protect the innocent purchaser of goods manufactured in violation of the
provisions of the Act, 1 and its consequent inapplicability to this general
fact situation.
Judicial reluctance to approve the payment of overtime to workers
for producing goods while the men who used them were subjected to the
rigors of battle' 2 completely confuses standards and subverts the pur-
poses of the Act.' 3 The belief of a subsequent Congress that these workers
were covered by the Act is indicated by the Portal-to-Portal Pay Act, which
was designed, inter alia, to prevent suits for "walking time" under the
Fair Labor Standards Act because of the cost to the Public Treasury
for war contracts previously entered into by the Government.' 4  Since
these employees obtained no civil service benefits, since the Fair Labor
Standards Act is remedial and is to be liberally construed, and since
there is no incontrovertible dogma which prohibits recovery, their in-
clusion within the Act has much to recommend it.
Motor Carriers-Minor Portion of Total Services in Interstate
Commerce-Drivers Subject to ICC to Exclusion of Fair Labor
Standards Act-Petitioner operated a general cartage business as
common carrier by motor vehicle, and as such was engaged in the "pro-
duction of goods for commerce," within the meaning of the FLSA.' Four
percent of his services were directly in interstate commerce, distributed
generally throughout the year and shared by all the drivers indiscrimi-
nately. The latter were paid their regular rate for overtime on the as-
sumption that they were subject to regulation by the ICC, and that there-
fore the overtime provisions of the FLSA did not apply to them.2  The
10. 52 STAT. 1060 (1938), 29 U. S. C. §203(c) (1940). "'Goods' means goods
(including ships and marine equipment), wares, products, commodities, merchandise,
or articles or subjects of commerce of any character, or any part thereof, but does not
include goods after their delivery into the actual possession of the ultimate consumer
thereof, other than producer, manufacturer, or processor thereof."
11. See Chapman v. Home Ice Co., 163 F. 2d 353, 355 (C. C. A. 6th 1943),
cert. denied, 320 U. S. 761 (1943) ; see also Wage and Hour Administrator's analysis,
20 LAB. REL. REP. (Wages and Hours) 3027, 3031 (1947).
12. Instant case at 1015. "The men who manned these boats got no overtime.
They staked and often lost their lives." See also Kennedy v. Silas Mason, 164 F. 2d
1016, 1018 (C. C. A. 5th 1948) ; Stewart v. Kaiser, 71 F. Supp. 551 (D. Ore. 1947).
13. See Walling v. Patton-Tully Transportation Co., 134 F. 2d 945, 949 (C. C. A.
6th 1943).
14. 61 STAT. 86 (1947), 29 U. S. C. A. § 251(a) 9 (Supp. 1947). SEN: REP. No.
48, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 32-39 (1947) ; H. R. REP. No. 71, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-6
(1947).
1. 52 STAT. 1063 (1938), 29 U. S. C. § 207(a) (1940). No employee so engaged
shall be employed. ". . . (3) for a workweek longer than forty hours after the ex-
piration of the second year from [the effective date of the section], unless such em-
ployee receives compensation for his employment in excess of the hours above specified
at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is em-
ployed. "
2. Section 13(b) (1) of the FLSA provides: "The provisions of section 7 [supra
note 11 shall not apply with respect to any employee with respect to whom the Inter-
state Commerce Commission has power to establish qualifications and maximum hours
of service pursuant to the provisions of section 204 of the Motor Carrier Act, 1935."
52 STAT. 1068 (1938), 29 U. S. C. § 213(b) (1) (1940).
RECENT CASES
Wage and Hour Administrator sued to enjoin this procedure as an
alleged violation of the FLSA. The District Court dismissed the com-
plaint, but was reversed in the Sixth Circuit.3  On certiorari the Supreme
Court held that, since safety in interstate commerce is controlling, the
ICC has power over the entire classification of the carrier's drivers, who
are thereby excluded from the FLSA. Morris v. McComb, 68 Sup. Ct.
131 (1947).
Under § 204 of the Motor Carrier Act of 1935, the Interstate Com-
merce Commission is charged with the power and duty of establishing
qualifications and maximum hours for the employees of a common car-
rier by motor vehicle.4 This power is limited to those employees whose
activities affect safety of operations.5 It is recognized in the subsequently
enacted Fair Labor Standards Act, which by § 13 (b) (1) 6 specifically
excepts from its wage-hour provisions the affected employees. In order
for § 13 (b) (1) to be effective it is necessary to find only the existence,
not the exercise, of the Commission's power.7
Except in the obvious cases, such as the full-duty driver at all times
driving in interstate commerce, the finding of the existence of the Com-
mission's power has admitted of difficulty, the Wage and Hour Adminis-
trator at one time contending that at least 50% of the employee's activities
must affect safety of operations.8 This view was rejected in the Levinson
case,9 which held that the power exists where a "substantial part" of the
employee's activities affect safety. The test of substantiality is the character
of the activities affecting safety, not the proportion of time spent therein. 10
Accordingly in the instant case full-time drivers and mechanics as a class
are subject to the power of the Commission, though in respect to time
spent only a minute portion of their duties relates to interstate commerce.
The grouping together into a class in order to obtain an average is an
awkward solution to a practical problem," but is clearly more conducive
of economic peace 12 than the variance which would result from treating
some drivers as within, and others as without, the exemption to the FLSA.
The only feasible alternative, a holding that the Commission has no power
with respect to the class, is suggested by the view that the FLSA, being
3. Walling v. Morris, 155 F. 2d 832 (C. C. A. 6th 1946), the court relying on the
fact that only a small amount of time was spent in interstate commerce.
4. 49 STAT. 546 (1935), 49 U. S. C. §304(a) (1) (1940).
5. United States v. American Trucking Associations, Inc., 310 U. S. 534 (1940).
6. Supra note 2.
7. Levinson v. Spector Motor Service, 330 U. S. 649, 678 (1947) ; Southland Gaso-
line Co. v. Bayley, 319 U. S. 44 (1943).
8. Interpretative Bulletin No. 9, November, 1943. WAGE AND HOUR MANUAL 520,
523 (1944-1945). Earlier the Administrator was of the opinion that the exception was
inapplicable to any employee who spent a substantial amount of time in non-exempt
work, interpreting substantial as more than 20% of his time. Interpretative Bulletin
No. 9, March, 1942, WAGE AND HoUR MANUAL 186, 189 (1943).
9. Levinson v. Spector Motor Service, 330 U. S. 649 (1947).
10. Id. at 674. The dissenting opinion is in accord on this point. Id. at 687. The
Levinson case was agreeably received by the motor carrier industry. "It will not be
necessary in the future to follow an employee around with a stopwatch in order to
determine exactly what percentage of his time is spent in each phase of his activities.
All that will be necessary is bona fide classification of employees." Beardsley, Wage-
Hour Law-Status of Motor Carrier Employees, 14 I. C. C. PAcr. J. 615, 619 (1947).
11. Instant case at 136. One result of the decision is to exclude from the FLSA
at least two drivers who made no trips in interstate commerce. See Mr. Justice Rut-
ledge dissenting, at 140.
12. Cf. Overnight Motor Co. v. Missell, 316 U. S. 572, 576 (1942).
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social legislation, should be broadly and liberally applied,13 and its ex-
emptions narrowly construed in the light of the statutory purposes.' 4 This,
however, would contravene the equally broad public policy of safety first
in interstate commerce.15 Congressional failure to modify the language
of § 13 (b) (1), in response to the suggestion of the Wage and Hour
Administrator, indicates an intent to give full recognition to the established
safety program of the Motor Carrier Act.'6 Since the FLSA nowhere
provides that the scope of this program is to be limited, and the possibility
of concurrent jurisdiction between the Commission and the Administrator
has been specifically rejected,' 7 the soundest result under the facts ap-
pears to have been reached.' 8
Public Utilities-Conditional Approval of Securities Issue by
State Public Service Commission-A public utility applied for author-
ization to issue securities, intending to use the proceeds for improvements
and refunding debt. The New York Public Service Commission found
these purposes proper,' but refused to approve the issue unless the com-
pany accepted certain conditions designed to remove alleged "impairments"
of its property, consisting of differences between "original" and "book"
cost 2 of purchased properties valued by the utility at purchase price, and
a deficiency in depreciation reserves computed by the Commission on the
"straight-line" basis as against the utility's "observed" depreciation. 3
13. See Tennessee Coal Co. v. Muscoda Local, 321 U. S. 590, 597 (1944).
14. See Phillips Co. v. Walling, 324 U. S. 490, 493 (1945).
15. See Levinson v. Spector Motor Co., 330 U. S. 649, 661, 662 (1947), and Mau-
rer v. Hamilton, 309 U. S. 598, 605 (1940).
16. See Levinson v. Spector Motor Co., 330 U. S. 649, 684, n. 27 (1947).
17. "Congress has prohibited the overlapping of the jurisdiction of the Admin-
istrator of the Wage and Hour Division, United States Department of Labor, with
that of the Interstate Commerce Commission as to maximum hours of service, Con-
gress might have done otherwise." Levinson v. Spector Motor Co., 330 U. S. 649, 661
(1947). Cf. Pyramid Motor Corp. v. Ispass, 330 U. S. 695, 708 (1947), and South-
land Gasoline Co. v. Bayley, 319 U. S. 44 (1943).
18. "Bona fide classification of employees" (Beardsley, supra note 10), enforced
by the judgment of fair-minded courts, provides adequate protection against deliberate
violations of the FLSA based on the reasoning of the instant case. The suggestion of
Mr. Justice Murphy, in his dissent at 139, that the FLSA may be avoided by occasion-
ally sending an employee on an interstate mission, is in any practical view manifestly
absurd.
1. N. Y. Pua. SERV. LAW § 69 permits the issue of securities for various enum-
erated purposes, ". . . provided . . . that there shall have been secured from the
Commission an order authorizing such issue . ...
2. "'Original cost' . . . means the cost of . . . property to the person . . .
first devoting it to the public service." 5 N. Y. CoDEs, RULES AND REGS. 802 (1945)
(uniform system of accounts for electric corporations).
"'Book cost' means the amount at which property is recorded in these accounts
without deduction of related reserves." 5 id. at 702.
3. "Under the straight-line method of accounting for annual depreciation, the total
depreciable value [cost minus estimated scrap value] of the property is divided by the
number of periods in the estimated service life of the property and the resultant figure
is the periodic depreciation." Haun, Inconsistencies in Public Utility Depreciation, 38
MicHa. L. Rzv. 150, 180 (1939).
"Observed" depreciation is based on a physical appraisal of the property. It
"would provide only for such physical wear and decay as can be readily seen and
would consist chiefly of the cost of placing the properties into good operating condi-
tion." Bauer, The Establishment and Administration of a "Prudent Investment" Rate
Base, 53 YALE L. J. 495, 509 (1944).
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The utility was required to transfer its entire earned surplus to an ear-
marked surplus account, remaining impairments to be made up through
monthly reservations of $75,000 from income for a decade. The com-
pany was also required to accrue no less than $2,100,000 property de-
preciation annually. In a 3-2 decision, the determination was annulled,
apparently on two grounds: (1) there was no substantial evidence of prop-
erty impairments, and (2) if there were, the Commission lacks power to
condition its approval of a proper request on correction of past errors
affecting valuation. Rochester Gas and Electric Corp. v. Maltbie, 9 LAw
REP. NEws No. 17, p. 2 (App. Div., 3d Dep't, Jan. 7, 1948).
The first ground presents a facet of the longstanding controversy
between commissions and utilities over valuation and depreciation methods.
The New York Public Service Commission is committed to the policy
of valuing utility property at original cost less accrued straight-line de-
preciation,4 but its efforts to compel utilities to keep their books on this
basis have been blocked by the legislature and the courts.5 Considerable
success has nevertheless been achieved through informal negotiation,6 es-
pecially concerning the authorization of securities issues; the Commission
trades its prompt approval, essential if the utility is to avail itself of a
favorable investment market, for the latter's agreement to adopt the de-
sired accounting policies. 7  And although utilities may accrue deprecia-
tion on any basis they please, in rate cases the Commission gives heaviest
weight to original cost depreciated by the straight-line method.8
While the first ground raises highly controversial issues, the judicial
attitude implicit in the second is probably more significant. Orthodox
statutory construction supports the conclusion that the Commission ex-
ceeded its powers,9 and apparently this court is not ready to follow the
Supreme Court of the United States in its virtual withdrawal from the
field of utility regulation, as indicated by the Hope Natural Gas de-
4. See New York Court Condemns Straight-line Depreciation, 41 PUBLIC UTILI-
TIES FORTNIGHTLY 173 (1948).
5. Brief for Petitioner at 57-58 lists the Commission's unsuccessful appeals to the
legislature in 1934 and 1936 for amendment of § 69 of the Public Service Law, note 1
supra. Attempts to prescribe depreciation methods to be used by utilities were deemed
by the courts to exceed the Commission's power (under § 52 and § 66, subd. 4 of the
Public Service Law) to establish uniform systems of accounts in People ex rel. New
York Rys. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm., 223 N. Y. 373, 119 N. E. 848 (1918) and New
York Edison Co. v. Maltbie, 271 N. Y. 103, 2 N. E. 2d 277 (1936). Following each
of these cases, the Commission repeatedly requested that it be granted power to control
utility accounting policies, but without result (see Brief for Petitioner at 42-43, 54-56).
6. E. g., surplus account adjustments have been made by Consolidated Edison Corp.
of N. Y. and Niagara Hudson Power Corp. following negotiations, the effect of which
was to reduce the net depreciated valuation of their properties by $162,565,000 and
$85,000,000, respectively. Ely, The Controversy Over Original Cost, 40 PUBLIC UTIL-
ITiES FORTNIGHTLY 108, 109 (1947).
7. See 2 BENJAMIN, ADMINIsTRATIvE ADJUDICATION IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK
104 (1942).
8. See 2 id. at 76-77. N. Y. PUB. SERv. LAW § 114 authorizes the Commission to
set temporary rates based on original cost of utility property less accrued depreciation.
9. While other sections of the Public Service Law (e. g., § 70, Transfer of
franchises or stocks; § 110, Control of holding companies and of transactions between
affiliated interests; and § 114, Temporary rates) state that action shall be taken by the
Commission when the public interest so requires, no such criterion appears in § 69,
which controls the instant case. This court has in the past interpreted § 69 more lib-
erally. See Staten Is. Edison Corp. v. Maltbie, 263 N. Y. 209, 213, 188 N. E. 713,
714 (1934); Public Serv. Comm. v. New York and Richmond Gas Co., 244 App. Div.
398, 403, 279 N. Y. Supp. 824, 829 (3d Dep't 1935) ("Unquestionably it was the legis-
lative intention . . . to protect not only utility corporations and their stockholders,
but primarily the investing public.").
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cision.1°  Similarly, the court cited the McCardle case" as rejecting the
use of straight-line depreciation, although the method was later employed
in the Lindheimer case 12 without objection. As a practical matter, the
instant decision would appear to defeat the very purpose for which the
Commission was created. Assuming, arguendo, that the Commission's
function is limited to protecting consumers, it does not follow that it should
ignore the interests of prospective investors, 13 favoring instead the present
holders of securities which represent overstated values. Consumers' in-
terests are best served by a policy which encourages the flow of new
capital required for the continued effective operation of utility enterprises.
If the property valuation as stated by the utility's prospectus substantially
exceeds its rate base, securities purchasers will receive disappointingly
low returns, and future investors will place their funds elsewhere. Valua-
tion for capitalization cannot be divorced from valuation for rate-mak-
ing.14 It is therefore difficult to perceive why the court said that the con--
ditions imposed by the Commission were extraneous, or why the Public
Service Law need be so rigidly construed as to require approval of any
securities issued for a statutorily proper purpose, regardless of "whatever
cracks might appear in the capital structure" 15 of the issuing corporation.
Unauthorized Practice of Law-Title Insurance Companies May
Draft Such Legal Instruments as Are Incidental to the Business of
Insuring Titles-Defendant title insurance company, for compensa-
tion, prepared various instruments relating to the transfer of interests in
land. Plaintiff Bar Association ' sought to have these activities enjoined
as violative of the Pennsylvania statute which declares it to be unlawful
for "any person, . . . , or corporation, ... , to practice law, . . . , without
having first been duly and regularly admitted to practice in a court of
record in any county of this Commonwealth. ." 2 The court held
that, since the acts complained of were done as an incident of the primary
business of the defendant, no injunction could issue. LaBrum v. Com-
nonwealth Title Co. of Philadelphia, 358 Pa. 239, 56 A. 2d 246 (1948).
"Practice of law," broadly defined, includes the preparation of all
"legal" instruments and the giving of advice relating to "legal" matters,
10. Federal Power Comm. v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U. S. 591 (1944). The
implications of that case are ably discussed by Welch, Status of Regulatory Commis-
sions under the Hope Natural Gas Decision, 32 GEo. L. J. 136 (1944).
11. McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Co., 272 U. S. 400 (1926).
12. Lindheimer v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 292 U. S. 151 (1934).
13. Quite apart from the question as to whether it is the Commission's function to
protect investors, it is evident that investors do in fact treat approval of a securities
issue as a guaranty of the issue's soundness. See IGNATIUs, FINANCING OF PUBLIC
SERVICE CoRPoRATIoNs 325-327 (1918); MEAD, JEREMIAH AND WARRINGTON, THE
BusiNEss CORPORATION 209-210 (1941).
14. See HARTMAN, FAIR VALUE (1920) for discussion of an analogous problem,
valuation for purposes of purchase and sale. The author concludes, at 89, "Both par-
ties must be governed to a large extent by the rate-making value of the property, since
it limits the future return."
15. Foster, J., dissenting in instant case.
1. Plaintiffs were members of the Philadelphia Bar Association's Committee on
Unauthorized Practice of Law.
2. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 17, § 1608o (Purdon, Supp. 1946).
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as well as the conduct of litigation.3 For practical purposes such a propo-
sition is too all-inclusive.4 Under the Pennsylvania statute the courts
have adopted two qualifications to the application of the general definition:
first, where simplicity of the questioned acts precludes the need for legal
skill,5 and second, where drafting of legal instruments is done incidentally
to the primary business of the draftsman. 6 In the latter test, upon which
this court purportedly based its decision, there is a presupposition that
the drafting of instruments which would be lawful when done incidentally
to some other and primary purpose, would be unlawful when done other-
wise. But the court points out that the acts in this case constitute con-
veyancing, which historically in Pennsylvania is an occupation apart
from the practice of law,7 and thus cannot be within the contemplation of
the statute without some express prohibition.8 Therefore, this case is of
doubtful authority as an example of the application of this second test.
On the other hand, although the court made the flat statement that con-
veyancing is not proscribed by the statute,9 it will be noted that the de-
cision was rested upon the broader ground of the second test.'0 Thus
the general proposition of the court as to conveyancing should be regarded
with circumspection and read only in relation to the specific categories of
persons, enumerated by the court, who traditionally engage in convey-
ancing, such as justices of the Peace, Aldermen, Real Estate Brokers,"
and, as in this case, Title Insurance Companies, all of whom in one man-
ner or another come under state supervision.' 2 It is doubtful that the
court intended to indicate that any layman might with impunity engage in
conveyancing as a business in itself. In addition to this, since the court ig-
nored the simple solution of the case in favor of a test of questionable ap-
plicability, there is an implication as to the possible future policy of the
court in relation to similar cases involving fields other than conveyancing.
The accepted reason of policy underlying restrictiofis upon the practice
of law is the protection of the public from the ignorant and unscrupulous.
13
The test which the court professed to adopt fails to measure up to that
standard. Obviously the incidental or primary purpose for which an
instrument is drafted is not necessarily material to the competence or in-
tegrity of the draftsman,14 but it is material as an indication of the practical
requirements of business efficiency in a particular business. It. is ap-
3. See In re Duncan, 83 S. C. 186, 189, 63 S. E. 210, 213 (1909) ; Child v. Smelt-
zer, 315 Pa. 9, 13, 171 Ad. 883, 887 (1934) ; BL. LAw Dict. 1394 (3d ed. 1933).
4. See People v. Title Guaranty & Trust Co., 227 N. Y. 336, 380, 126 N. E. 666,
670 (1919); Ashley, The Unauthorized Practice of Law, 16 A. B. A. J. 558, 559
(1930) ; for a suggestion that such a definition covers areas outside of the regulatory
powers of the courts, see 95 U. oF PA. L. REv. 219 (1946).
5. Shortz v. Farrel, 327 Pa. 81, 92, 193 At. 20, 30 (1937) ; see also Blair Motor
Carrier's Service Bureau, 40 Pa. D. & C. 413, 422 (1941) ; In re Eastern Idaho Loan
and Trust Co., 49 Idaho 280, 285, 286, 288 Pac. 157, 159 (1930).
6. Childs v. Smeltzer, 315 Pa. 9, 14, 171 Atl. 883, 887 (1934) ; instant case at 242,
56 A. 2d at 249.
7. Watson v. Muirhead, 57 Pa. 161 (1868) ; Bodine v. Wayne Title Co., 33 Pa.
Super. 68 (1906).
8. Instant case at 241, 56 A. 2d at 248.
9. Ibid.
10. Id. at 243, 56 A. 2d at 250.
11. Id. at 241, 56 A. 2d at 248.
12. Particularly in relation to real estate transactions, see PA. STAT, ANN., tit. 63,
§§ 436.1, 436.2 (Purdon, 1941), § 437 (Purdon, Supp. 1946); see also General Incor-
poration Act of April 29, 1874, Pub. L. No. 73.
13. See Opinion of the Justices, 289 Mass. 607, 614, 194 N. E. 313, 320 (1935).
See also Kephart, The Unauthorized Practice of Law, 40 DIcK. L. REv. 225 (1936).
14. See Merrick v. American Security & Trust Co., 107 F. 2d 271, 277 (App. D.
C. 1939).
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parent, therefore, that this policy reason has given way to a recognition of
the demands of business expedience. Increase of government regulation
of individual and business affairs has brought a corresponding increase
of public demand for cheap, readily accessible guidance in matters which
are at least technically "legal." 15 The lawyer, hampered by a rigid code
of ethics which prohibits advertising, among other things, 16 has been un-
able to respond to this demand as well as the layman, not similarly handi-
capped.' 7 The policy manifested in the instant case seems to foreshadow a
liberal attitude toward lay agencies which provide the public with needed
services that are technically "legal" in their nature, but properly incidental
to a primary business.
United States, Interstate Commerce Commission-Motor Car-
rier Purchase and Control-Railroad Affiliation-The Continental
Bus System, Inc., the Dixie Motor Coach Company, and the Santa Fe
Trail Transportation Company, three motor carriers operating extensively
between Texas and California, proposed to transfer a total of about ten
million dollars worth of assets to the Transcontinental Bus System, Inc.,
a corporation formed expressly to effect their consolidation. Transcon-
tinental agreed in return to issue its capital stock to each of the three
in proportion to their various contributions. In the case of Santa Fe Trail
and Dixie, the shares were to be issued directly to the corporations. Con-
tinental, however, would cease to exist as a separate entity, and the
quota of stock assigned to it would therefore be divided among its eleven
former shareholders. As a result of this plan, Santa Fe Trail would own
39.1% of the shares of Transcontinental, Dixie 26.9%, and the next
largest shareholder 5.6%. Santa Fe Trail, a wholly owned subsidiary
of the Santa Fe Railroad, was guaranteed two representatives on the
nine-man board of directors. In approving this consolidation' the In-
terstate Commerce Commission ruled, inter alia, that Transcontinental
would not be affiliated with a railroad sd' as to make applicable the proviso
of § 5 (2) (b) of the Act 2 requiring special findings of fact in the event
15. The number of individual federal income tax returns in 1936 was 2,880,990.
Philadelphia Inquirer, April 20, 1938, editorial page. In 1947 there were 48,500,000
individual federal income tax returns. Letter from the Department of Internal Rev-
enue to the Philadelphia Inquirer, Jan. 25, 1948.
16. THE CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHIcs, adopted by the American Bar Associ-
ation, Sept. 30, 1937. See Canon 27 specifically.
17. Llewellyn, The Bar's Troubles, and Poultices-And Cures, 5 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 104 (1938).
1. Under the Interstate Commerce Act all mergers between carriers of any type
must be approved by the Commission, 54 STAT. 899, 905, 49 U. S. C. § 5 (1940).
2. "Provided, That if a carrier by railroad subject to this part or any person
which is controlled by such a carrier, or affiliated therewith within the meaning of
paragraph (6), is an applicant in the case of any such proposed transaction involving
a motor carrier, the Commission shall not enter such an order unless it finds that the
transaction will be consistent with the public interest and will enable such carrier to
use service by motor vehicle to public advantage in its operations and will not unduly
restrain competition."
§ 5(6) reads as follows: "For the purpose of this section a person shall be held
to be affiliated with a carrier if, by reason of the relationship of such person to such
carrier, . . . it is reasonable to believe that the affairs of any carrier of which con-
trol may be acquired by such person will be managed in the interest of such other car-
rier."
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of such affiliation. A. C. Allyn and Company, et al.-Control; Transcon-
tinental Bus System, lnc.,--Control-Continental Bus System, Inc., et al.,
Doc. No. MC-F-3504, Feb. 10, 1948.3
The instant case represents a significant departure from previous
rulings concerning the scope of the proviso involved. It is true that an
equal or greater percentage of railroad ownership has been held not to
constitute affiliation in the past, but in each of these former situations
actual legal control could be found to exist elsewhere.4  The theory relied
on was that so long as a motor carrier held 51% of the voting shares,
affiliation with a railroad was impossible, 5 and even this doctrine was at
times repudiated. 6 Santa Fe Trail, however, will be the largest single
shareholder of Transcontinental-a factual distinction which would appear
to be of considerable importance.7 Indeed, it is difficult to draw any logical
line between the present decision and a holding that the proviso will apply
only when control is shown to exist in the railroad, and it may well be
argued that the Commission has construed the meaning of "affiliated
therewith" virtually to extinction.
8
The danger of complete circumvention of the Congressional intent
of prohibiting rail domination of the motor carrier field,9 becomes even
more apparent when the result of the instant approval is examined in the
light of the background of Santa Fe Trail. In authorizing the original
acquisition by that company of the assets which it now intends to transfer
to Transcontinental, the Commission ruled that a showing by the sub-
sidiary of the railroad that there was inadequate transportation in the
area proposed to be served was sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the
3. Division 4 had approved the transactions in a ruling handed down December
9, 1947, and the case came before the entire Commission on a petition for reconsidera-
tion. Commissioner Miller, who had dissented from the decision below, and Commis-
sioner Aitchison wrote separate concurring opinions advocating the inclusion in the
instant order of a requirement that Santa Fe Trail put its shares in trust and give up
its representation on the board of directors.
4. All cases cited by the Commission, including those in the Division 4 order,
sheets 21, 22, and those of the instant opinion, sheet 5, were situations of this type.
Mergers involving 49% railroad control have been approved in the past without apply-
ing the proviso: e. g., Richmond Greyhound Lines, Inc.-Control-Peninsula Transit
Corporation, 5 M.C.C. 394 (1938), 35 M. C.C. 555 (1940), 36 M.C.C. 747 (1941).
This case and many of those cited by the Commission were decided under the Motor
Carrier Act of 1935, 49 STAT. 543, 555-556 (1935), but the statutory test of affiliation
was identical, 48 STAT. 218 (1933).
5. For an early pronouncement of this rule see Southwestern Greyhound Lines,
Inc.-Purchase-R. W. Lee, 25 M. C. C. 195, 196 (1939).
6. Southwestern Greyhound Lines, Inc.-Merger-Arkansas Motor Coaches, Lim-
ited, Inc., 39 M. C. C. 243 (1943).
7. The test under § 5 (6) is whether ". . . it is reasonable to believe that the
affairs of any carrier . . will be managed in the interest of such other carrier."
The Commission has previously ruled that this does not mean solely or even princi-
pally in the interest of such other carrier. Richmond Greyhound Lines, Inc.-Control
-Peninsula Transit Corp., 5 M. C. C. 394, 398 (1938). Thus the presence or absence
of legal control by a motor carrier is of the utmost significance.
8. Since the proviso contains both "controlled by" and "affiliated therewith" a
holding that only control will make it applicable is a holding that "affiliated there-
with" is superfluous. Cf. Richmond Greyhound Lines, Inc.-Control-Peninsula Tran-
sit Corp., supra note 7 at 397.
9. See 79 CONG. RFc. 5655, 12206 (1935) for statements to this effect concerning
§ 213 (a) of the Motor Carrier Act, 49 STAT. 543, 555, 556 (1935). Despite the change
from "promote the public interest" to "consistent with the public interest" when the
section was incorporated into the Interstate Commerce Act, the purpose of the proviso
remains the same, 86 CONG. REc. 10188, 11546 (1940).
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proviso ' 0-- a piece of statutory interpretation as questionable as that in
the present order." Thus by stretching the meaning of § 5 (2) (b) both
ways simultaneously, in cases concerning the same carrier, the Commis-
sion has permitted the Santa Fe Railroad to attain its present position of
powerful influence in a competing transportation industry.' 2  Some ex-
planations of this liberal consolidation policy may be found in economic
theory that integration is in the long run beneficial to the country as a
whole,'3 and the contention that the section under discussion is incon-
sistent with the Act's general purpose of establishing a strong national
transportation system is a plausible one.14 But in view of intimations by
the Supreme Court that the proviso must be construed in the light of the
legislative purpose behind it,' 5 it is doubtful whether even the strongest
policy considerations can justify the instant decision.
10. "Although the bus operation north of Flagstaff here involved cannot be said
to be in territory parallel and adjacent to a railroad, such operation for the most
part penetrates territory not served by other transportation agencies." Santa Fe Trail
Stages, Inc.-Control-Central Arizona Transportation Lines, et al., 1 M. C. C. 225,
231 (1936). See Santa Fe Trail Stages, Inc.-Control-Rio Grande Stages, Inc., 5
M. C. C. 17 (1937); Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co.-Control-Western Transit
Co., 5 M. C. C. 81 (1937) ; and Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co.-Merger-Santa
Fe Stages, Inc., et al., 5 M. C. C. 324 (1937).
11. Up until the decisions listed in note 10 supra the substantive requirements of
the proviso as established by Pennsylvania Truck Lines, Inc., Acquisition of Control
of Barker Motor Freight, Inc., 1 M. C. C. 101 (1936), restricted motor carrier control
by railroads to lines "auxiliary and supplementary" to the railroad. For a discussion
of this doctrine and its ultimate expansion, see Meck and Bogue, Federal Regulation
of Motor Carrier Unification, 50 YALE L. J. 1376, 1408-1418 (1941). See Interstate
Commerce Commission v. Parker, 326 U. S. 60 (1945). Although the Commission
was there upheld it would appear that the Court considered the Barker test as the one
to be applied, p. 70, n. 5. See also the dissenting opinion of Douglas, J., at page 75.
12. It is interesting to note that Senator Shipstead in a speech opposing the change
in the wording of § 213 (a) during the debate on the Transportation Act of 1940 spe-
cifically mentioned the Santa Fe Railroad ap one which was seeking motor carrier
domination. 86 CONG. R c. 11637 (1940).
13. The railroads propose this as the only practical solution to the transportation
problem. Wall Street Journal, Sept. 11, 1943, p. 1, col. 6; DRAYTON, TRANSPORTATION
UNDER Two MASTERS 54-82 (1946). On the other hand the American Trucking Asso-
ciation has gone on record as opposing integration, 11 I. C. C. PRAcr. J. 140, 331
(1943). See WIPRUD, JUSTIcE N TRANsPoRTAToN 34-37, 69, 140 (1946). WATERS,
ComPETiPoN IN TRANSPORTATioN (1938) presents an exhaustive survey of the possible
systems of regulation.
14. See Interstate Commerce Commission v. Parker, 326 U. S. 60, 66 (1945);
Schrag, Competing Modes of Transportation and the L C. C., 94 U. OF PA. L. REv.
378, 380-383 (1946).
15. In McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U. S. 67 (1943), the Court
approved a Commission finding of non-affiliation in a case where Kuhn, Loeb and Co.
holding less than 1% of the voting shares outstanding had one man on a nine-man
board of directors, but that the question was one for serious consideration, see pp. 73,
84n. 21, 90-92.
